Despite the worst expectations in the weeks before the summit, the G8 gathering in L’Aquila handed over neither a significant outcome nor an embarrassing disaster. Participants seemed pleased with the Italians who were praised for their excellent job in managing the whole choreography and delivering a great party. The Italian organisers must felt relieved, especially as some commentators seemed prepared to support Italy’s expulsion from the G8 on the ground of poor organisational skills and its Prime Minister’s penchant for scandals.

The idea that Italy was risking the expulsion hit the main headlines in the first day of the summit, with no further follow-up. But it is disconcerting and interesting at the same time. It is disconcerting because of the implicit assumption that the G8 membership could be decided on the basis of how efficient a country is in organising a meeting and how effective, and credible, the leadership of the hosting leader is. But the organising country does not equate the entire G8 even if it plays an important role in shaping the summit, and determining its relevance.

It is interesting because it shows how much the issue of architectural change – expansion and even expulsion – is entangled in the G8 process. L’Aquila summit was more than the sum of its parts. As we read in previous entries for this blog, for each day of the summit, a cluster of different leaders were invited for topical discussions on issues ranging from trade to climate to aid. Only on the first day did the G8 meet by itself. During the rest of the programme leaders from all regions of the world turned up for talks on specific topics on the agenda. This ‘variable geometry’, to use the expression coined by the Italian presidency, helped the summit morph from a negotiating forum to a structured dialogue. In this respect L’Aquila was already a post-G8 summit.

This, and the continuation of the Heiligendamm Process, that features the G5 – China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico – in an enhanced dialogue on economic and environmental issues, are L’Aquila’s most significant outcomes. Both bring the issue of governance straight to the core of the G process. Governance was the ‘elephant in the room’, the missing item on the agenda, the key to the dialogue. Italy’s ‘variable geometry’ was an imperfect and temporary solution to the question of architectural change and how to accommodate emerging powers. It was, nevertheless, an improvement from the 2008 G8 in Hokkaido.

Governance and in particular the G8-G20 relation should inform the debate in the year to the 2010 Muskoka summit. In particular, the G8 will need to rethink its position in a world in which it no longer enjoys primacy and where economic power is more diffuse. The view that the G20 should become the forum for global issue is becoming increasingly common. The G8, therefore, is under pressure to shift itself while retaining some relevance. One option would be to turn the G8 into an effective and likeminded caucus of representative democracies, overcoming both internal substantive and less significant differences. This, however, would involve a serious debate on the role of both Russia and the EU.

Of course future developments depend on whether the G20 will keep momentum. Not surprisingly then, the summit in Pittsburgh at the end of September holds the key to the G process. Being the third leaders’ level summit in less than a year and hosted by the US, it will tell whether the G20 has mutated, by then, in an ongoing dialogue, or it is doomed to fail by excessive summitry. It should also provide some indications on how the US Administration intends to bring the G process forward.

Discussing and implementing the governance of the Gs is a fundamental step to inject some legitimacy in the dialogue and to avoid that declarations such as “They [the G8 Leaders] shared a vision of a world economy that is open, innovative, sustainable and fair” sound like nice, but empty words.

Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.

Yesterday, in their joint declaration, G8 and G5 countries committed themselves to work together to address international governance challenges. To facilitate continued dialogue on issues such as investment, intellectual property and climate, the leaders announced an extension of the Heiligendamm Process – renaming it the Heiligendamm-L’Aquila Process (HAP) – the structured dialogue among the officials of the established industrialized countries  and the major emerging economies of the global South – China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico.

In this exclusive video, Andrew F. Cooper interviews Ulrich Benterbusch, Director of the Heiligendamm Dialogue Process at the OECD. Since the 2007 Heiligendamm G8 Summit, Mr. Benterbusch has been the primary facilitator of this program that has allowed for confidence building and partnerships among G8 and G5 states, development of common policy towards critical global issues, as well as spill-over affects for the international financial institutions.

To view the complete documents outlining the progress of the HDP and agenda of the HAP, see:

Promoting the Global Agenda: Joint G8-G5 Declaration  (9 July 2009)
ANNEX 1: HDP Concluding Report
ANNEX 2: The Agenda of the Heiligendamm-L’Aquila Process (HAP)

As Mr. Benterbusch explains, the structured dialogue format provides for less predetermined outcomes and deeper understandings between the participants. The HDP has developed a “special atmosphere” where officials are able to discuss political and economic issues in an open manner. He identifies investment as an area where much progress has taken place and G8-G5 have agreed to reduce or avoid protectionist measures while fostering future bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Looking ahead to the 2010 G8 Summit in Muskoka, Canada, Mr. Benterbusch notes that the new phase of the process or HAP has signalled a willingness of the partners to engage in a “more ambitious way” towards tangible results. While there are numerous important issues on the global agenda, the HAP will not be seeking to invent new policy areas, rather it will be able to provide a setting where these issues can be addressed in an informal manner that can yeild common positions. This, from Mr. Benterbusch’s perspective, forms the “value-added” of the HAP.

Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.

Jennifer Clapp
CIGI Chair and Professor, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo

Food security is on the agenda as the G8 leaders meet this week in L’Aquila, Italy. It is an appropriate moment to be addressing this important issue, as the FAO recently announced that the number of undernourished people on this planet has now surpassed 1 billion. This is an historic high for the number of people experiencing severe hunger.

It is extremely troubling that global hunger is on the rise despite the fact that food prices on international markets are lower today than they were last year at this time, when the G8 leaders last met. When looking at the factors contributing to this situation, it becomes clear there are multiple complex causes to the current food situation, many of which have sources in rich countries. These problems have been exacerbated by the current economic crisis as it spreads from North to South.

• Food prices are still relatively high in developing countries, as reported recently by the FAO, despite the drop in prices on global markets. Short term supply bottlenecks in poor countries, exacerbated by a lack of financing for imports due to the global credit crunch, have contributed to these higher local prices.
• Food price volatility on global markets remains a threat. There is growing recognition that financial speculation on agricultural commodity markets in industrialized countries – driven by global financial market volatility in recent years – played a key role in bidding up prices so quickly in 2008, as noted in a recent US Senate report on the topic.
• The current economic crisis is pushing more people into poverty. This trend is confirmed by a recent UN progress report on the Millennium Development Goals, which indicates that 55-90 million more people will be living in extreme poverty in 2009 than was anticipated.  Poor people in developing countries spend on average some 50-80 percent of their income spent on food. If their incomes fall, so does their access to food.
• The economic crisis has also meant a general contraction in the availability of credit within countries, which affects developing world farmers’ ability to invest in the expansion of agricultural output.
• There has been a serious decline in both government and multilateral agricultural investment over the past 30 years in developing countries. The share of agriculture in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) declined from 18 percent in the 1979 to just 3.5 percent in recent years. Even the World Bank admits that its support for agriculture dropped from over 30% of its lending in 1980 to just 12 percent in 2007. The ability to increase agricultural investment is threatened by cuts to both domestic budgets and foreign aid in the wake of the current economic crisis.
• Food import dependence has been on the rise in developing countries in recent decades, particularly in the least developed countries. This problem is outlined in a recent UNCTAD report on the impact of the food crisis on Africa. The report  points out that years of agricultural trade protectionism by rich industrialized nations – which led to low world food prices for most of the past 30 years – contributed to food import dependence and vulnerability to food price volatility in the world’s poorest countries.
• Food aid is woefully underfunded and lacks flexibility. Although donor countries pledged additional food aid funds at last year’s G8 Summit, the level of food aid commitments in 2009 is down as the economic crisis takes its toll on aid budgets. The WFP recently announced that it has raised less than one quarter of its US $6.4 million budget for 2009. In addition to funding shortfalls, much of the food aid available is inflexible, making it highly inefficient as an aid resource. Although most other major donors have untied their food aid, the largest donor of international food aid, the US, continues to tie most of its food aid to US-produced grain. Tied food aid results in long delays and high transportation costs, meaning that fewer hungry people can be fed than would be the case if the same amount were spent locally, within developing countries, to source the food. The US Government Accountability Office has published a new report on the idea of local and regional procurement (LRP) of food aid in developing countries, highlighting the efficiency gains of this practice. Yet the 2008 US Farm Bill only approved a small pilot project for LRP while continuing to tie virtually all of its food aid.

Given the enormity of the factors contributing to global food insecurity today, it is important that the G8 Leaders come to an agreement to address these problems in a meaningful way. The first ever G8 Agriculture Ministers’ meeting back in April of this year was largely viewed as a failure. Beyond agreeing that the food security situation is grim, not much was accomplished in terms of agreement on the way forward.

There is no silver bullet solution to global food insecurity. The problem is enormously complex. In the midst of trying to address the situation, the G8 leaders must not forget that the global economic crisis, which originated within their own territories, is a major exacerbating factor. Rather than proposing a single solution, they must approach the problem on multiple fronts and recognize that their own economic policies – both now and in the past – have enormous relevance for determining the way forward.

Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.

As a member of the G8, Japan often does not get the attention it deserves. Perhaps more than in any member country, domestic politics have dictated Japan’s engagement in the summit process and the issues it chooses to discuss through this forum. A year after the Hokkaido Toyako Summit, there is a different Japanese leader in the G8 “family photo” and likely to be another one before the next summit begins.

In this video, Andrew F. Cooper interviews Hugo Dobson – Professor of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield – to discuss the differences between the 2008 and 2009 summits and the factors that play into Japan’s performance in the G8 process. First and foremost, he points to the more relaxed atmosphere in L’Aquila where activities at Toyako were quite regimented and organized. Press briefings by the Japanese foreign ministry have been conducted in a much more informal manner, contrasting starkly with last year.

Secondly, Dr Dobson observes the much reduced presence of Japanese civil society organization at the L’Aquila Summit. At Toyako, there appeared to be a “head of steam” growing among these groups, while mostly regionally based, and in their more formal participation in the summit process. This momentum, in his observations, has subdued partially due to the broader concerns of recovery in the world economy.

In the 35 years of its membership, Japan has positioned itself as the Asian representative and has resisted any changes that may jeopardize this position. At the same time, China’s economy has doubled many times over since its economic reforms in the late-1970s and is now a major economic power. Dr Dobson points out that during the G20 London Summit earlier this year there was great talk of a new power dynamic between the United States and China, dubbed the ‘G2′. China’s emergence has shifted the balance in East Asia, and through the Heiligendamm Process, a greater case has been made for full membership in the G-club; a change that Dr Dobson suggests Japan will very actively defend its position and avoid stall reform initiatives.

Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.

Gregory Chin

On the eve of their meeting with the G8, the G5 group of major emerging economies – Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa – discussed the use of their own currencies to settle trade accounts among themselves, Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon told reporters. According to Menon, the suggestion to explore this possibility came from Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva.

Menon wanted to clarify that this does not mean the G5 having a new currency or alternative reserve currency. China, Russia, Brazil, France, and to a lesser degree India had expressed an interest in the talks between G5 and G8 leaders due on Thursday including debate on seeking long-term alternatives to the US dollar as the global reserve currency. Brazil and China have, of course, already established arrangements to settle a portion of their trade in their own currencies.

In the G5 Political Declaration issued at the end of their meeting on the first day in L’Aquila, “the 5” gave a strong message calling for the “full, immediate implementation of the G20 Summit Declaration of London, with no delay”. The G5 declaration also emphasizes their joint intention to “continue promoting the reform of the international financial system”, and to “establish a new international financial order” that will be “just, fair, inclusive, and well-administered”. The G5 pledged to “dedicate the necessary efforts to resolve the issue of the inadequate representation of developing countries in international financial institutions”, which they added, “must be carried out immediately.”

For added interest, just this morning, China’s stand-in representative, State Councilor Dai Bingguo raised China’s concerns about currency stability and the reform the international monetary system in delivering the official Chinese presentation to the G8-G5 meeting – looking across the room to the US President and those members of the G8 which had resisted putting the currency issue on the agenda. And in case anyone was wondering whether Beijing is waffling on the currency issue, the Chinese official spokesperson confirmed at the press briefing following the meeting that this is the “official position” of the Chinese government, thus overriding earlier attempts from the foreign ministry to downplay the currency debate.

Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.

Andrew F. Cooper
Associate Director and Distinguished Fellow, CIGI

While the BRIC group of states have grabbed a great deal of attention with their landmark leaders’ summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, 15 June 2009, their expanded G5 alter ego has been a significant force at this week’s G8 Summit in L’Aquila.

Coined by Goldman-Sachs, the original BRIC investment acronym has moved from a laudatory account of the rise of 4 big economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China) to a geo-political reality. Such a shift indicates the extent to which we are moving into a more contested global order. In many ways, the BRIC countries are more interesting for their differences than their similarities. Brazil and India are robust democracies. Russia is a managed democracy. China is a one party state. India has a fast rising population. Russia is in serious demographic trouble with a sharply reduced life expectancy. Brazil and Russia are resource rich. India and China are resource dependent.

Yet as exhibited by the Yekaterinburg summit, some degree of coherence is taking shape. When Goldman Sachs labelled the 4 states the BRIC, the focus was on their enhanced and successful integration into the world economy. The first leaders’ BRIC summit sent a different more contested signal. Meeting in back to back fashion with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which includes Iran as an observer), the BRICs exploited the US’s relative decline in economic power by calling for a new multi-polar world order. Although more striking for its declaratory than operational force, the BRIC at least sets up a scenario in which the relationship between the West and a big state component of the Rest is based on competition not cooperation.

The formalization of the G5 meetings – or what we call the B(R)ICSAM group - establishes the possibility of a far more cooperative scenario. At odds with the myriad of failures attached to the L’Aquila G8 summit, the emergence of the G5 with some degree of collective identity via the Heiligendamm Dialogue Process (HDP) is a striking and largely unattached positive development. When the HDP was mooted at the 2007 summit, it appeared to be merely another form of ‘outreach’. Indeed Japan as host in 2008 consistently referred to this process in this manner, playing down the HDP and playing up G8-driven outreach.

This constellation shifts the focus from the centrality of Russia – a country with a markedly straddling status. If standing out as the putative leader of BRICs Russia is also different from the rest of BRICSAM because of its membership in the G8. Instead attention is placed on the other non-G8 countries, China, India and Brazil as well as Mexico and South Africa. Akin to the BRICs this grouping is highly divergent as illustrated by Mexico’s membership in the OECD and South Africa’s connections to alternative clubs ranging from the Commonwealth to the Cairns group. What unites them is a common sense that they are bridging countries, combining a dynamic image of global reach and a sense of attachment to the global South.

Arguably the most attractive feature of the L’Aquila summit is the consolidation of the HDP. At the German 2007 summit the B(R)ICSAM remained cautious to this initiative. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was especially sensitive to any sense that the G5 were being treated as unequals. Moving ahead as a structured dialogue rather than as a negotiating forum – as described by Ulrich Benterbusch in a video blog today – with an emphasis on specific topics did an impressive job of confidence building.

Instead of withering away the HDP has been endorsed by both the G8 and the G5 as worthy of continuation. The G8 Leaders Declaration on World Economy stated that the HDP should be embellished over another two year period. The G5 leaders have bought in to this novel form of partnership among ‘equals’.

As in the case of the BRICs, this evolution of G5/B(R)ICSAM is still very much a work in progress. However, it points to the space for cooperation on a functional basis, not only economic issues (most notably intellectual property and investment, and development), but on non-traditional forms of security. It also reinforces the idea that we could be moving towards a caucus system as the G8 rethinks its position in a world in which it is no longer enjoys primacy and the G5 juggles new responsibilities.

Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.

Andrew F. Cooper
Associate Director and Distinguished Fellow, CIGI

The G8 Summit at L’Aquila is a study in contradictions. The Italian presidency’s approach remains a languid one amidst an intense global recession. Here, style trumps substance. The site of the summit – re-located at the last moment in sympathy with the victims of the devastating earthquake is still a work in progress. The host government from the start lacked any overarching vision for the Summit. The brand trotted out in the last few weeks, that L’Aquila represented a “summit of principles”, crumbled quickly amidst its inconsistency with the scandals associated with Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.

The United States tried to rescue the G8 by taking on some elements of leadership. Key sherpa meeting were called and shaped by American officials. A big delivery has been promised in the form of a major initiative on food security. Yet, these moves can not mask the reality that the US has already moved on from prioritizing L’Aquila to focus its attention on the Pittsburgh G20 on September 24-25. L’Aquila has become a minor whistle stop in a crowded tour, in which the instrumentalism of the re-setting US-Russian relations is mixed with the symbolism of Obama’s private audience with the Pope and his emotive trip to Ghana as the first African-American president.

Yet just as the meeting of leaders cannot escape the local predicament of the L’Aquila populace, the global crisis and possible alternative solutions to them continues to stare them in the face. No longer is the G8 a small intimate gathering where declarations are made by a small group of leaders operating on an exclusive basis. The G8 has become a place where a range of cameo appearances are made by leaders from all regions of the world. Only on the first day, with a relaxed mid-day start, does the G8 meet by itself. And even the notion of the G8 as a ‘likeminded’ group of representative democracies is complicated by the presence of Russia. This puts serious obstacles in the way of a firm resolution sanctioning Iran, to give just the most obvious illustration.

Without a sense of urgency or a fixed menu about what and how the world economic crisis should be handled, Italy has presented a buffet spread of countries and leaders around the table. The second day sees two important meetings with wider constellations of countries. In the morning, a meeting takes place between the G8 with the so-called G5 of big emerging states. In the afternoon, a meeting of the Major Economies Forum on climate and energy will be convened jointly by Berlusconi and Obama. Opening up the forum even further on the third day, a constellation of African countries have been welcomed to L’Aquila to talk aid and food.

In terms of legitimacy, such variable geometry looks attractive, in that it can be considered a response to the criticism that the G8 is an unelected club. However, the basic reality of world politics is that the loss of exclusivity signals erosion not a firming up of efficiency. Facilitated by the laxness by the Italian hosts, the G8 as a club is eroding as the hub of global governance. There is no going back to the cozy comforts of its origins in the mid-1970s. But it cannot find traction either in being a mock version of a universalistic body.

From this perspective, it is tempting to simply see the gravity of power (and status of club membership) moving from the G8 to the G20. As Chancellor Angela Merkel pronounced in her speech to the Bundestag last week, the G8 may remain a role as a discussion group, but decision-making will shift to the G20.

As I will comment tomorrow, the details such a shift though must still be nuanced. If building momentum such a shift is full of complexity that need full discussion. Can what is in effect a crisis committee become institutionalized as the new top club? At the same time, the club will continue to have factions that both cooperate and compete. Can the older G8 members – in effect the G7 plus the EU Commission – bounce back from the signs of its depleted status to recompose itself as an effective caucus, moving past both internal stylistic and substantive differences (as illustrated most dramatic models of regulations versus stimulus).

And just as crucially can some order be provided in our characterizations of the new rising cluster, beyond simply the G20 minus the G8? Is this cluster a loose array of states, as diverse as Turkey, Australia and Indonesia? Or is there a core group from within? This will be the focus of another posting on the last day of the L’Aquila Summit.

Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.

As US President Barack Obama attends his first G8 summit, questions linger on his ability to renew American  multilateralism. While the new president has certainly developed enormous goodwill among other major countries, critical tests of his interest in utilizing multilateral institutions to address economic and security issues remain on the horizon.

In this video, Andrew F. Cooper interviews Keith Porter – Director of Policy and Outreach at the Stanley Foundation – on the anticipated renewal of US multilateral activities and what types of policies it can take to make the world more secure.  The G8 and G20 Summits, in his view, provide a stage for sorting out many of these types of questions as the informal agenda of this ”rolling meeting” of important world leaders opens up avenues for targetted multilateralism.

Mr. Porter stakes out the important role the US can have international institutions, both in the formal (like the UN) and the informal (like the G8), and how it can lead in reforming them to better reflect the new balance of world power. In his view, this also means using such fora to engage in important political and security issues, including instability in Iran and nuclear aggression by North Korea.

Even in this Italian-hosted G8 meeting, the US has stepped-up to make things work. There are reports that US officials were called in to facilitate last-minute planning and document preparations. Likewise, Thursday’s Major Economies Forum on climate and energy will be co-hosted by Berlusconi and Obama, a signal perhaps that the US administration either wants to keep discussions on track or be able to claim its successful outcomes.

Many dilemmas, domestically and abroad, challenge the Obama administration’s commitment to multilateralism – many of which will come to the fore as it sets to host the next G20 Summit in Pittsburgh.

Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.

Gregory Chin
Senior Fellow, CIGI

Some air has just been let out of the G8 balloon. Chinese President Hu Jintao has left the G8 Summit in L’Aquila Italy, to return home to deal with domestic unrest in China’s far western autonomous region, Xinjiang – leaving him unable to attend the Day Two meetings between the G8 and the “G5” emerging economies. Hu has left behind Dai Bingguo, State Councilor to represent China’s top leader.

Dai Bingguo is no slouch inside the Party command. In addition to being the government executive that is most responsible for overseeing the country’s foreign affairs, Dai is the director of the office of the Party’s powerful Leading Small Group for Foreign Affairs, and the office of the Party’s Leading Group on National Security. He is a key official in the new Strategic and Economic Dialogue between the US and China, and a point person on China’s relations with Africa and the Arab world. Dai Bingguo is clearly a safe pair of hands both inside the Party and government hierarchy. Nonetheless, his arrival on the tarmac in L’Aquila will not have the same effect as the arrivals of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Brazilian President Lula de Silva, or even Mexican President Felipe Calderón or South African President Jacob Zuma.

What effect will Hu’s departure have on the G8 Summit? It is likely that the G5 Joint Statement that will be released later on Day One – at the same time that the G8 release their Joint Statement – was already drafted, reworked, and agreed to in advance of the Chinese President’s departure. This document will largely be the work of the foreign ministry “sherpas” anyways. More interesting will be the joint documents that will be released at the end of the Day Two G8/G5 meetings. Even here, some of the major statements will already have been worked out in advance, in particular the statements regarding the final report of the Heiligendamm Dialogue Process, the “structured dialogue” process between the G8 and the G5 that was launched at the German Summit back in 2007. The key plans on next steps for this dialogue process will also have been worked out in advance of Hu’s departure.

Hu has already accomplished his bilateral mission in visiting Italy, having led a delegation of over 200 Chinese business representatives to various Italian cities and signing close to US$3 billion in commercial deals, including a big new automotive joint venture agreement between Fiat and Guangzhou Automotive Corporation, which is also partnered with Honda and Toyota in southern China. China’s relations with Italy have expanded rapidly over the past ten years, as part of the EU’s expanding economic and cultural ties with the Chinese, and since 2004, under the “strategic partnership” signed by China and Italy. Interestingly, the Italians have outpaced the “G7” nation that they are usually compared with – Canada – in building stronger ties with a rising China. So Hu has locked up this part of this overall visit to Southern Europe, before going home.

Hu’s departure has more symbolic impact than tangible consequences, as most of the “major” agreements of the Italian Summit will already be sown up by the start of Day One. This says something about the real value-added of the G8 Summits at this point in world affairs. It raises the question of whether the leaders of the world’s most powerful countries are actually taking on the toughest issues when they meet face-to-face at this Summit? For the Italian hosts, Hu’s departure also puts a crimp in their efforts to portray the L’Aquila Summit as more than mere outreach, of real inclusion, in a substantive dialogue with the G5.

One of the unintended consequences of Hu’s departure for the G7/G8 may turn out to be whether Hu Jintao will reflect back on his shortened time in Italy, and ask himself whether he and China have lost anything by his departure. Chinese strategists may also ask what – in terms of tangible breakthroughs – has been the lost by the absence of their top leader at the Day Two meetings? It has now fallen to Mr. Dai to navigate whatever tangible issues will be discussed on Day Two and liaise on behalf of Mr. Hu. If the G8 Summit does not deliver some substantive results from the G8/G5 dialogue, new agreements that were not already pre-scripted, it will be difficult for the top Chinese leadership to see the cost in not be there. What could this also mean for the G8 if the other more powerful members of the G5, namely India and Brazil also start questioning the attendance of their top leaders?

It is quite possible that the leaders of “the 3” could place less priority on attending future G8 Summits if this mechanism continues to under-deliver on substantive results. This could be especially so if the next host – Canada – does not come up with a compelling reason for them to attend. What could be the implication? Perhaps the reality of domestic political realities and challenges is starting to catch up with the international Club of traditional powers. And the decision of the Chinese leader to abruptly return home to deal with more pressing governance issues, and leave behind the leaders of the old powers, may be the pin prick on the balloon of the old Club.

Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.

Growing antipathy in the G8 process, largely as a result of the successful operation of two G20 summits, has constrained the Italian hosts of the 2009 session to be held in L’Aquila this week. Various formations of multilateral meetings seem to be crowding out the traditional central decision-shaping role of the G8 club.

In this video, Gregory Chin interviews Dr. Paola Subacchi - Research Director, International Economics, Chatham House – to discuss the momentum of the G20 process, how the Italian presidency has managed this competition, and the possibility of a G2 condominium of power between the United States and China.

Preparations for the 2009 G8 by the host country deserve much credit.  In Dr. Subacchi’s view, their work on developing an agenda that is relevant on priority global issues as well as incorporating numerous non-G8 countries in the discussions, despite various constraints, has been impressive. What has been called “variable geometry”, to have different players around the table on different issues, has been embraced. In this way, the L’Aquila summit has worked to incorporate elements of the G20 format, where more countries are around the table, while providing space for key bilateral meetings such as the G2, deflecting what could be seen as a ‘post-G8′ moment.

While the G20 has continued much of its momentum from London, Dr. Subacchi suggests that the main economic discussions will be left to Pittsburgh in September. In respect to a G2, she notes that L’Aquila will offer an interesting venue in which to observe the natural dialogue that could emerge between these two poles.

Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.